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3 Introducing  Th e Philosophy of Creativity 
 E L L I OT  S A M U E L   PAU L  A N D   S COT T  B A R RY   K AU F M A N  
 Th ere is litt le that shapes the human experience as profoundly and pervasively as 
creativity. Creativity drives progress in every human endeavor, from the arts to the 
sciences, business, and technology. We celebrate and honor people for their creativ-
ity, identifying eminent individuals, as well as entire cultures and societies, in terms 
of their creative achievements. Creativity is the vehicle of self-expression and part 
of what makes us who we are. One might therefore expect creativity to be a major 
topic in philosophy, especially since it raises such a wealth of interesting philosophi-
cal questions, as we will soon see. Curiously, it isn’t. 
 To be sure, some of the greatest philosophers in history have been taken with the 
wonder of creativity. 1 To name just few examples: Plato has Socrates say, in certain 
dialogues, that when poets produce truly great poetry, they do it not through knowl-
edge or mastery, but rather by being divinely “inspired”—literally, breathed into—
by the Muses, in a state of possession that exhibits a kind of madness. 2 Aristotle, in 
contrast, characterized the work of the poet as a rational, goal-directed activity of 
making ( poeisis ), in which the poet employs various means (such as sympathetic 
characters and plots involving twists of fate) to achieve an end (of eliciting various 
emotions in the audience). 3 Kant conceived of artistic genius as an innate capacity 
 1  Or what we now call “creativity.” According to some scholars, that abstract noun did not exist in 
European languages until the 19 th century—but the phenomenon, and interest in it, certainly did. (See, 
e.g. Władysław Tatarkiewicz,  A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics (Th e Hague, NL: Martinus 
Nijhoff , 1980), esp.  chapter 8.) For other discussions of the complex history of terms and concepts 
associated with creativity, see, e.g., Darrin M. McMahon,  Divine Fury: A History of Genius . Perseus Books 
Group, 2013; Murray, Penelope, ed.  Genius: Th e history of an idea . New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989; 
Milton Charles Nahm,  Genius and Creativity: An Essay in the History of Ideas . Harper & Row, 1965. 
 2  Plato,  Ion and  Phaedrus , in  Th e Complete Works of Plato, eds. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson 
(Hackett  Publishing, 1997). Cf. Elizabeth Asmis, “Plato on Poetic Creativity,” in  Th e Cambridge 
Companion to Plato , ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
 3  Aristotle,  Poetics , in  Th e Complete Works of Aristotle: Th e Revised Oxford Trans- lation , vol. II, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Press, 1984). For a sophisticated defense of the Aristotelian 
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to produce works of “exemplary originality” through the free play of the imagina-
tion, a process which does not consist in following rules, can neither be learned nor 
taught, and is mysterious even to geniuses themselves. 4 Schopenhauer stressed that 
the greatest artists are distinguished not only by the technical skill they employ in 
the production of art, but also by the capacity to “lose themselves” in the experi-
ence of what is beautiful and sublime. 5 Nietzsche saw the greatest feats of creativity, 
exemplifi ed in the tragic poetry of ancient Greece, as being born out of a rare coop-
eration between the “Dionysian” spirit of ecstatic intoxication, which imbues the 
work with vitality and passion, and the “Apollonian” spirit of sober restraint, which 
tempers chaos with order and form. 6 Th is is just the barest glimpse of what each 
of these philosophers had to say about creativity, and many other fi gures could be 
added to their number. 
 Nevertheless, while some of the topics explored by earlier thinkers have come to 
occupy a central place in philosophy today—such as freedom, justice, conscious-
ness, and knowledge—creativity is not among them. Philosophy has seen some 
very important work on creativity in the last few decades, 7 but not nearly at the rate 
that we see for subjects of comparable range and importance. Indeed, “the philoso-
phy of creativity” is still a neologism in most quarters—just as, for example, “the 
philosophy of action” and “the philosophy of music” were not too long ago. 
 In contrast, psychology has seen a defi nite surge of interest in creativity. In 1950, 
J. P. Guilford gave a presidential address at the American Psychological Association 
calling for research on the topic. 8 And the fi eld soon took off  with waves of research 
investigating the traits and dispositions of creative personalities; the cognitive and 
neurological mechanisms at play in creative thought; the motivational determinants 
of creative achievement; the interplay between individual and collective creativity; 
the range of institutional, educational, and environmental factors that enhance or 
inhibit creativity; and more. Today, the blossoming of this fi eld can be seen in the 
fl urry of popular writing reporting on its results 9 ; an offi  cial division of the American 
idea that the creative process is fundamentally rational, see Gaut, Berys. “Creativity and Rationality.” 
 Th e Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70, no. 3 (2012): 259-270. 
 4  Immanuel Kant,  Critique of the Power of Judgment , eds. Eric Matt hew and Paul Guyer 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 43–50 
 5  Arthur Schopenhauer,  Th e World as Will and Representation , vols. I and II, trans. E. F. J. Payne 
(New York: Dover, 1969). See vol. I, pp. 184–194, and vol. II, pp. 376–402. 
 6  Friedrich Nietzsche,  Th e Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings , eds. Raymond Geuss and Ronald 
Speirs (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
 7  Samples of this work can be found in these two collections: Michael Krausz, Denis Dutt on, and 
Karen Bardsley,  Th e Idea of Creativity (Boston: Brill, 2009); and  Th e Creation of Art: New Essays in 
Philosophical Aesthetics , eds. Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
 8  J. P. Guilford, “Creativity,” in  American Psychologist 5 (1950), pp. 444–454. 
 9  See, e.g., the psychology section of  Th e Creativity Post :  htt p://www.creativitypost.com/psychology . 
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Psychological Association on the psychology of aesthetics, creativity, and the arts 
(Division 10); numerous academic conferences; multiple peer-reviewed journals 10 ; 
several textbooks 11 ; and a growing number of undergraduate and graduate courses 
all devoted to the psychology of creativity. According to one historical overview, 
creativity has been studied by nearly all of the most eminent psychologists of the 
20th century, and “the fi eld can only be described as explosive.” 12 
 Th e swell of interest in the science of creativity is an inspiring example for the 
philosophy of creativity, but more importantly, it off ers a resource that philoso-
phers should be mindful of as they pursue this eff ort. Unfortunately, philosophers 
writing on creativity have sometimes tended to ignore the scientifi c literature. In 
some cases, they have gone so far as to claim—aft er citing just a few studies—that 
creativity is by its very nature unpredictable and therefore beyond the scope of sci-
ence. 13 Although the question of whether creativity is explicable is a philosophi-
cal question, it is not one that is impervious to empirical work. Aft er all, anyone 
who declares from the armchair that something cannot be explained is liable to 
be refuted in the event that researchers do fi nd ways to uncover explanations. Th e 
question of whether creativity can be explained empirically is itself, at least partly, 
an empirical question. 
 In fact, a number of issues arise at the nexus between philosophy and psychology 
and are handled best with contributions from both. Th is interdisciplinary approach 
is embraced by a new school of creativity researchers who are part of much 
broader trend toward dialogue and collaboration between scientifi cally-minded 
 10  Psychology of Aesthetics; Creativity and the Arts; Creativity Research Journal; Journal of Creative 
Behavior; International Journal of Creativity and Problem Solving. 
 11  J. C. Kaufman,  Creativity 101 (New York: Springer, 2009). K. Sawyer,  Explaining Creativity: Th e 
Science of Human Innovation , 2nd ed. (New  York:  Oxford University Press, 2012). R.  W. 
Weisberg,  Creativity:  Understanding Innovation in Problem Solving, Science, Invention, and the Arts 
(New York: Wiley, 2006). 
 12  Robert S. Albert and Mark A. Runco, “A History of Research on Creativity,” in  Handbook of 
Creativity , ed. Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 16–31 
at p. 17. 
 13  Paul Feyerabend, “Creativity—A Dangerous Myth,” in  Critical Inquiry 13, no.  4 (1987), 
pp. 700–711; Carl R. Hausman, “Criteria of Creativity,” in  Th e Concept of Creativity in Science and Art , 
eds. Denis Dutt on and Michael Krausz (Amsterdam: Springer, 1985), pp. 75–89. Carl R. Hausman, 
 A Discourse On Novelty and Creation (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1975). I. C. Jarvie, “Th e Rationality 
of Creativity,” in  Th e Concept of Creativity in Science and Art , eds. Denis Dutt on and Michael Krausz 
(Amsterdam:  Springer, 1985), pp.  109–128. John Hospers, “Artistic Creativity,” in  Th e Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43, no. 3 (1985), pp. 243–255. For more optimistic perspectives, see Dustin 
Stokes, “Incubated Cognition and Creativity,” in  Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, no. 3 (2007), 
pp. 83–100. Larry Briskman, “Creative Product and Creative Process in Science and Art,” in  Inquiry 
23, no. 1 (1980), pp. 83–106; and Maria Kronfeldner, “Creativity Naturalized,” in  Th e Philosophical 
Quarterly 59, no. 237 (2009), pp. 577–592. 
oxfordhb-9780199836963.indd   5 12/3/2013   12:34:01 PM
I n t r o d u c t i o n6
philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists. 14 And the essays in this vol-
ume illustrate numerous ways in which the exchange can be fruitful, as philoso-
phers draw on scientifi c research and scientifi c work is informed by philosophical 
perspectives. Below, we present a bird’s-eye view of these chapters and the themes 
and issues they explore. 15 
 Th e Concept of Creativity 
 Perhaps the most fundamental question for any study of creativity, philosophical or 
otherwise, is  What is creativity? Th e term “creative” is used to describe three kinds 
of things: a  person , a  process or activity , or a  product , whether it is an idea in some-
one’s mind or an observable performance or artifact. Th ere is an emerging consen-
sus that a product must meet two conditions in order to be creative. It must be  new , 
of course, but since novelty can be worthless (as in a meaningless string of lett ers), 
it must also be  of value . (Researchers sometimes express this second condition by 
saying a product must be “useful,” “appropriate,” or “eff ective.”) 16 Th is defi nition is 
anticipated, in a way, by Immanuel Kant, who viewed artistic genius as an ability to 
produce works that are not only original—“since there can be original nonsense”—
but also “exemplary.” 17 
 14  For refl ections on diff erent trends in this movement, see Jesse Prinz, “Empirical Philosophy 
and Experimental Philosophy,” in  Experimental Philosophy , eds. Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); and “Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive Science” in 
 Th e Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science , eds. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, and Stephen 
P. Stich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 3–18. Th e chapters of this handbook explore 
connections between philosophy and cognitive science on various topics. Th e integration is especially 
pronounced in research on such topics as color perception (e.g., Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert, 
“Color Realism and Color Science,” in  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26, no. 1 [2003], pp. 3–21) and 
causal cognition (e.g., Tania Lombrozo, “Causal-Explanatory Pluralism: How intentions, functions, and 
mechanisms infl uence causal ascriptions,” in  Cognitive Psychology 61, no. 4 [2010], pp. 303–332). 
 15  For another survey of the fi eld, see Berys Gaut, “Th e Philosophy of Creativity,” in  Philosophy 
Compass 5, no. 12 (2010), pp. 1034–1046. 
 16  Notable exceptions to this view include Dustin Stokes, “Minimally Creative Th ought,” in 
 Metaphilosophy 42, no. 5 (2011), pp. 658–681; and Mark A. Runco, “Parsimonious Creativity and 
its Measurement,” in  Measuring Creativity: Proceedings of European Council Meeting On Creativity and 
Innovation , ed. E. Villalba (Luxembourg: Publications Offi  ce of the European Union, 2010), pp. 393–
405, who argue that (at least for certain purposes) it’s best to work with a more minimal conception of 
creativity that involves novelty but doesn’t require value. Th ere may also be  additional requirements. 
It has been argued, for example, that in order for a product to count as creative, it must be surprising 
(Novitz; Boden), or produced intentionally (Gaut), or in a non-mechanical fashion with fl air (Gaut). 
 17  Immanuel Kant,  Critique of the Power of Judgment , eds. Eric Matt hew and Paul Guyer 
(New  York:  Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.  43–50. See also Paul Guyer, “Exemplary 
Originality: Genius, Universality, and Individuality,” in  Th e Creation of Art , eds. Berys Gaut and Paisley 
Livingston (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 116–137. 
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 In  chapter 1, Bence Nanay argues that creativity is primarily an att ribute not of 
products, but of mental processes. Some have suggested that what makes a mental 
process creative is the use of a certain kind of functional or computational mecha-
nism, such as the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s concep-
tual space. Against this view, Nanay off ers what he calls an experiential account of 
creativity. He contends that what is distinctive about the creative mental process is 
not any functional/computational mechanism, but the way in which it is experi-
enced. In particular, the process yields an idea that the creator experiences as one 
she hadn’t taken to be possible before. 
 Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art 
 One might suppose that if creativity has been understudied in philosophy at large, 
this couldn’t be so when philosophers are focused on art in particular. Art was 
long thought to have a monopoly on human creativity 18 ; it is still the paradigm of 
a creative domain, as “creative” is sometimes used more or less as a synonym for 
“artistic” and, at least in modern times, artists are disparaged when seen as deriva-
tive and praised for originality. But while the philosophy of art has been concerned 
with such issues as the defi nition, interpretation, and ontology of art, it has tended 
not to refl ect on the artist  as a creator , or the artist’s labors  as a creative process , or 
the work of art  as an expression of creativity . Th us Gaut and Livingston observe that 
“[a] lthough the creation of art is a topic that should be a central one for aesthetics, it 
has been comparatively neglected in recent philosophical writing about art.” 19 
 Gregory Currie brings the issue of creativity to the fore in  chapter  2, where 
he examines the popular idea that eminently creative works of literature provide 
insight into the workings of the human mind. Many advocates of this view write as 
if its truth were self-evident. Currie suggests that it is not, that indeed there is litt le 
evidence in its favor, and he considers how the claim might be tested. Recent experi-
mental studies by Oatley and colleagues look promising in this regard, but Currie 
suggests that their results so far provide very weak evidence at best. In the absence 
of bett er evidence, Currie puts a new spin on the debate by emphasizing the  creativ-
ity that goes into producing such great works of fi ction. Are there aspects of literary 
creativity that should reliably lead to insights about the mind? He considers two 
such aspects—the institutions of literary production and the psychology of literary 
 18  Władysław Tatarkiewicz,  A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics (Th e Hague, NL: Martinus 
Nijhoff , 1980), esp.  chapter 8. 
 19  Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston, “Introduction:  Th e Creation of Art:  Issues and 
Perspectives,” in  Th e Creation of Art:  Issues and Perspectives , eds. Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 1. 
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creativity—and suggests that in both cases, there are some grounds for thinking 
that literary creativity is not reliably connected with the production of insight. 
 Noël Carroll brings another dimension of creativity into view in  chapter  3. 
Although he agrees that we should att end to the creative activities of the artist, he 
suggests that we should also acknowledge the contribution of the  audience . For in 
order for the artist to accomplish the eff ects to which she aspires, Carroll argues, the 
audience must creatively cooperate with what the artist has initiated. He explores 
how audiences co-create artworks through the play of imagination. Rather than 
treating the imagination as if it were a single monolithic phenomenon, however, 
he identifi es and analyzes several diff erent imaginative activities that are engaged 
in response to a variety of artworks, such as reasoning counterfactually, fi lling-in 
unspecifi ed content, constructing story-worlds around fi ctional objects, mentally 
simulating characters’ experiences and points of view, and freely devising and play-
ing with diff erent meanings, interpretations, and unifying themes. By means of 
these activities, Carroll suggests, it is ultimately the audience’s contribution that 
makes a work of art “work.” 
 In  chapter 4, Christopher Peacocke raises interesting questions for aesthetics 
that bear upon the study of creativity. While philosophers have long debated the 
question of what makes something a work of art, Peacocke asks: What makes a work 
an example of a particular  artistic style ? He suggests that answering this question is 
a precondition for research on creativity in musical composition. Just as researchers 
who study perception understand that we cannot account for how the content of 
a perception is computed without specifying what the content is, Peacocke sug-
gests that we cannot explain how a composer creates in his particular style unless 
we identify what is distinctive about that musical style. Using the example of the 
Romantic style of music, Peacocke’s approach draws on the perception of expressive 
action in combination with an account of what is involved in hearing emotion and 
other mental states in music. Th e account can link the phenomenology of musi-
cal perception with the ideas and ideals of the Romantic movement. He notes that 
by changing various parameters in the account, we can explain what is variously 
distinctive about impressionist music, expressionist music, and some neoclassical 
composing in the style of Stravinsky. 
 Ethics and Value Th eory 
 One thing that makes creativity such a gripping topic is that we cannot fully under-
stand ourselves without taking it into account. Creativity seems to be linked to our 
very identity; it is part of what makes us who we are both as human beings and 
individuals. With regard to the latt er, each of us can ask, “What makes me who I am 
(as an individual)?” and we might wonder whether the answer has something to do 
with creativity. 
oxfordhb-9780199836963.indd   8 12/3/2013   12:34:02 PM
Int rod u c i ng  Th e  P hi l os ophy  o f  Cre at iv i t y 9
 According to an ancient and still infl uential view, the self (one’s life) is some 
kind of dramatic or artistic performance. Exploring this idea in  chapter 5, Owen 
Flanagan notes that there are metaphysical and logical questions about whether and 
how self-creation and self-constitution are possible. But he points out that there 
are also normative questions associated with the idea that life is a performance and 
the self is something that both emerges in and is constituted by that performance. 
Are there norms or standards that apply to self-constituting performances, and if so, 
what are they? Flanagan examines three contemporary psychopoetic conceptions 
of person—“day-by-day persons,” “ironic persons,” and “strong poetic persons”—in 
order to explore potential normative constraints on “performing oneself.” Flanagan’s 
provocative paper has implications for a number of diverse views in philosophy and 
psychology, from Jerome Bruner’s narrative theory of “self-making stories” to David 
Velleman’s paradox of self-constitution. 
 In  chapter 6, Matt hew Kieran asks what it is to be a creative person, and whether 
it involves a kind of virtue or excellence of character. He notes that there is a minimal 
sense according to which being creative means nothing more than having the abil-
ity to produce novel and worthwhile artifacts. Yet, he argues, there is a richer sense 
of the term that presupposes agential insight, mastery, and sensitivity to reasons in 
bringing about what is aimed at. A stroke victim who reliably produces beautiful 
patt erns as a byproduct of his actions is not creative in the richer sense in which an 
artist who aims to produce them and could have done so diff erently is. Is creativity 
in this richer sense ever more than just a skill? In the light of suggestive empirical 
work, Kieran argues that motivation is central to exemplary creativity. Exemplary 
creativity, he argues, involves intrinsic motivation and is a virtue or excellence of 
character. We not only praise and admire individuals whose creative activity is born 
from a passion for what they do but, other things being equal, we expect them to 
be more reliably creative across diff erent situations than those who are extrinsically 
motivated. Th is is consistent with the recognition that intrinsic motivation is not 
required to be creative and people’s creative potentials diff er. Creativity in people 
will fl ourish when intrinsic motivation is foregrounded, with the relevant values 
and socioeconomic structures lining up appropriately. It tends to wither when they 
do not (unless a person’s creativity, like Van Gogh’s, is exceptionally virtuous). 
 Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science 
 In  chapter 7, Simon Blackburn briefl y remarks on the history of the idea—voiced 
by Plato, echoed by philosophers and artists in the Romantic tradition, and still 
present in the popular imagination—that creativity involves something mystical 
or supernatural. Against this notion, Blackburn draws on fi ndings of modern psy-
chology to off er a tamer view. He argues that even the most extraordinary creative 
achievements are the result of ordinary cognitive processes. 
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 In  chapter  8, Dustin Stokes ventures to clarify exactly what the relation is 
between creativity and imagination. In his view, imagination is important for even 
the most minimally creative thought processes. Th is would be a pointless tautology 
if “imagination” just means (the capacity for) creativity. Th e key, then, is to identify 
what imagination is such that it is  not the same thing as creativity but still essen-
tial for it nonetheless. As Stokes notes, few philosophers have thought through the 
distinction between imagination and creativity, and few psychologists have directly 
tested the diff erence between the two constructs. While grounding his paper in 
contemporary philosophy, Stokes also draws on cognitive and developmental psy-
chology to identify the architectural features common to genius-level creativity, as 
well as more everyday forms of creativity. He starts by making a distinction between 
“truth-boundedness”—cognitive states that function to accurately represent the 
world—and “non truth-bound” states that do not function to accurately represent 
the world, but instead facilitate the manipulation of the information they represent. 
He argues that richly creative achievements in the arts and sciences, as well as more 
everyday breakthroughs, draw on cognitive manipulation processes. Stokes con-
cludes that imagination serves the cognitive manipulation role and is typifi ed by 
four features: It is non truth-bound, under immediate voluntary control, engages 
with aff ective and motivational systems, and drives inference and decision- making. 
Stokes’s essay has implications for a number of philosophical problems relating to 
imagination and fi ction, as well as psychological issues relating to the role of con-
scious, deliberate thought in creativity. 
 On the latt er question, there is a tendency that appears in various forms through-
out intellectual and artistic history to regard conscious thought as irrelevant or even 
inimical to creativity. In the classical story where creative inspiration comes to an 
artist from an external muse, the artist’s consciousness is not the source, but rather 
the recipient, of creative work. Th e same is true when an insight is said to emerge 
from the unconscious mind, showing up in consciousness as a kind of pleasant 
surprise (Eureka!). Th ere is also the popular perception that conscious thought 
 impedes creativity; thus the familiar accounts of artists using drugs, alcohol, or other 
trance-inducing practices as a means of surrendering conscious control and giving 
free rein to the creative unconscious. 
 In  chapter 9, however, psychologists Roy Baumeister, Brandon Schmeichel, and 
C. Nathan DeWall suggest that consciousness deserves more creative credit. Th ey 
present evidence to support the notion that creativity requires an interactive col-
laboration of conscious and unconscious processes. In their view, creative impulses 
originate in the unconscious but require conscious processing to edit and integrate 
them into a creative product. Th ey review psychological experiments showing that 
creativity declines sharply when consciousness is preoccupied (for example, impro-
vising jazz guitar while counting backward by six, or drawing with colored pencils 
while listening closely to music). Th ey conclude that the research contradicts the 
popular view in both psychology and philosophy that consciousness is irrelevant 
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or an impediment to the creative process. Instead, they believe that the research fi ts 
well with recently emerging understandings of the special capabilities of conscious 
thought. 
 Earlier, when we discussed the potential connection between creativity and 
self-understanding, we were concerned with what makes each of us who we are as 
individuals. But we can also ask, more generally, what makes us who we are  as a 
species , and there is a long tradition of Western thought that seeks to understand 
what makes us human in terms of what makes us  distinctively human, and set apart 
from other animals in particular. Whatever we think of the existing proposals that 
highlight our allegedly unique possession of reason, language, and metacognition, 
creativity seems as good a candidate as any. Th e tricky question, of course, is how 
did creativity evolve in humans? 
 In  chapter 10, Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers provide an integrated 
evolutionary and developmental account of the emergence of distinctively human 
creative capacities. Th eir main thesis is that childhood pretend play (e.g., imagining 
batt ling spaceship invaders) is a uniquely human adaptation that functions in part 
to enhance adult forms of creativity. 
 In support of their view, they draw on a wide literature spanning evolutionary, 
cognitive, and developmental psychology. Th ey begin by reviewing evolutionary 
accounts of what makes humans unique, including our language, enhanced working 
memory, culture, and convergent and divergent thinking. Th ey consider pretend 
play as a distinctively human ability, noting its universality, and showing that nearly 
all children, cross-culturally, engage in it. Th ey review existing views of the func-
tional roles of pretend play, including the facilitation of social schemata and theory 
of mind. Unconvinced by these accounts, they argue instead that pretend play facili-
tates creative thought—a process that involves both defocused att ention and cogni-
tive control. Th ey review a number of common capacities of both pretend play and 
creativity, including generativity, supposing, bypassing the obvious, and selection 
of valuable but less obvious ideas. Th ey conclude that childhood pretense paves the 
way for creativity in adulthood. Th is chapter is a fi ne example of how philosophers 
can contribute to our understanding of issues that are also pursued by scientists, in 
this case concerning the emergence of the capacities we have as human beings to 
pretend and create. 
 In our technologically driven age, it is not uncommon to think of what makes 
us human in contrast not only to other animals but also to machines, computers, 
and robots. Artifi cial intelligence is becoming ever more sophisticated, and some 
programs already display certain marks of creativity, appearing in major art galleries 
and garnering patents. Th ese are machines whose products are both valuable and 
new. In addition to these two standard conditions, Margaret Boden maintains in 
 chapter 11 that a creative product is one that is surprising as a result of the combina-
tion, exploration, or transformation involved in producing it. She gives examples of 
artifi cial intelligence systems that fi t all of these criteria, and raises this intriguing 
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question: Could a computer-based system ever “really” be creative? Th is leads to 
interesting philosophical issues about what constitutes “real” creativity. With some 
qualifi cation, she argues that real creativity involves autonomy, intentionality, valu-
ation, emotion, and consciousness. But as she points out, the problem is that each 
one of these elements is controversial in itself, even if we don’t consider it in rela-
tion to creativity and/or artifi cial intelligence. Boden concludes that we will not be 
able to understand whether creativity and artifi cial intelligence are contradictions 
in terms until we have clear and credible accounts of all these matt ers. Her chapter 
thus highlights the important role that philosophy can play in both psychology and 
artifi cial intelligence by further clarifying the constructs involved. 
 Philosophy of Science 
 Today, it’s understood that creativity can be at work in virtually every human pur-
suit. In the past, however, thinking about creativity tended to be much less inclu-
sive. Once again, Kant is a telling example. Having defi ned genius as the capacity to 
produce ideas that are both original and exemplary (i.e., “creative” in our terms), he 
asserted that genius could only be manifested in the fi ne arts. 20 Scientists were not 
geniuses because they follow the set procedures of the scientifi c method rather than 
giving free rein to their imaginations. Even Isaac Newton, whom Kant called the 
“great man of science,” was not deemed to be a creative genius. Nor, for that matt er, 
was Kant himself! 
 Despite the much broader scope that we now accord to creativity, there is still a 
remnant of the Kantian intuition in popular stereotypes of the creative person that 
are more strongly associated with the artist than with anyone else. In  chapter 12, 
psychologist Dean Keith Simonton argues, in eff ect, that there is something right 
about this Kantian tendency, as he explores the question: How does creativity diff er 
between domains? In so doing, he integrates two philosophical traditions. Th e fi rst 
tradition, stemming back to Auguste Comte, is concerned with whether the sciences 
can be arrayed into a hierarchy. Th e second tradition, which includes Alexander 
Bain and William James, concerns whether creativity and discovery involve a pro-
cess of blind-variation and selective-retention (BVSR). Th e key part for this issue is 
blind-variation. Roughly, a process is “blind” to the extent that the probability of it’s 
generating a certain idea is not a function of that idea’s utility or value. A completely 
random procedure would be an example, though not the only example, of a blind 
process. Drawing on psychological research, Simonton shows that a valid hierar-
chy can be formed based on objective criteria regarding creative ideas, products, 
and persons. In place of Kant’s stark dichotomy between the sciences and the fi ne 
 20  Kant (ibid.). 
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arts, Simonton’s hierarchy comprises a wide range of disciplines in the sciences, the 
humanities, and the arts. Where a discipline falls in the hierarchy depends on the 
extent to which practitioners need to engage in BVSR processes in order to make 
contributions that are creative (new and useful). Domains at the top of the hierar-
chy (i.e., sciences) rely more on sighted variations, whereas domains at the bott om 
(i.e., arts) depend more on blind variations. Simonton also shows that a discipline’s 
position in the hierarchy depends on the characteristics and developmental experi-
ences of the creator. Simonton’s chapter is an intriguing synthesis of issues in both 
psychology and philosophy regarding the classifi cation of creativity across domains. 
 Philosophy of Education (and Education of Philosophy) 
 Our fi nal two chapters deal with the teaching and learning of creativity. It is not 
unusual to fi nd people who assume that creativity is an innate capacity that cannot 
be taught or learned. Edward Young and Immanuel Kant were part of a long tradi-
tion of thinkers who held such a view, and in arguing for it, they did us the service 
of exposing the kinds of assumptions that make it seem compelling. In  chapter 13, 
Berys Gaut identifi es two key arguments: Th e fi rst is that learning requires imita-
tion, which is incompatible with creativity; the second is that learning consists in 
following rules, which is incompatible with creativity. Aft er criticizing these argu-
ments, Gaut develops a positive case for the teachability of creativity, based on the 
teachability of the kinds of abilities and motivations that are involved in creativity. 
Th ere is a sense in which Gaut’s question can be sett led empirically: We can show 
that creativity  can be taught simply by pointing to cases where it  has been taught. 
Gaut himself discusses such examples as they occur in mathematics and fi ction writ-
ing, noting in particular how heuristics or rules of thumb are used in these domains. 
But while such cases may suffi  ce to show that creativity can be taught, Gaut further 
enriches our understanding by explaining  how this is possible despite the common 
misconceptions that may seem to rule it out. Having given a philosophical account 
of how creativity can be taught, he ends by applying his analysis to the teaching of 
creativity within philosophy itself. 
 With this last theme, Gaut has a kindred spirit in Alan Hájek, the author of our 
fi nal chapter. In fact, between the two of them, we have an instance of “multiples” 
in creativity research, cases where people working independently arrive at the same 
discoveries at about the same time. 21 Although Gaut and Hájek were unaware of 
each other’s essays before submitt ing them for this volume, they converged on an 
interesting proposal—that by using various heuristics, philosophers can enhance 
 21  Dean Keith Simonton,  Creativity in Science: Chance, Logic, Genius, and Zeitgeist (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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their abilities to make valuable contributions to their fi eld, including ideas that are 
distinctively creative. 
 As Hájek notes, it is said that anyone of average talent can become a strong chess 
player by learning and internalizing certain  chess heuristics —“castle early,” “avoid 
isolated pawns,” and so on. Analogously, Hájek suggests, philosophy has a wealth 
of heuristics— philosophical heuristics —although they have not been nearly so well 
documented and studied. Sometimes these take the form of useful heuristics for 
generating counterexamples, such as “check extreme cases.” Sometimes they sug-
gest ways of generating new arguments out of old ones, as in “arguments involving 
possibility can oft en be recast as arguments involving time, or space.” Sometimes 
they provide templates for positive arguments (e.g., ways of showing that something 
is possible). Hájek off ers this chapter partly as an introduction to a larger project of 
identifying and evaluating philosophical heuristics, illustrating them with numer-
ous examples from the philosophical literature. Th is work is a creative contribution 
to the philosophy of education. And it off ers insights for the philosophy of creativity 
too, as it shows in fi ne detail how, contrary to a common assumption, creativity can 
be compatible with and even enhanced by the following of rules. 
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